As we know, professional baseball organizationally is the most economically diverse managerial sport in the world. From a business perspective, this statement doesn't exemplify more truth when you analyze how teams spend millions of dollars every year on a plethora of speculative minor league draft picks like a hedge-fund investor buying risky high-priced stocks on Wall Street. This is the moment, where super-star pitcher Clay Buchholz (2005 Red Sox draft pick) interjects into the Sox's long-term business equation as well as his valuable roster spot giving the Red Sox franchise tremendous economic leverage both financially and structurally in relation to the constant flow of developing impact talent.
For starters, there is no other professional sports league that involves franchises investing such large amounts of money into drafting unknown players, when there is constantly a high-risk level and limited growth potential coinciding with each other at the same time. In the other major American professional sports such as (MLS, NBA, NFL, NHL), when teams' draft early to mid-round players, there is a almost near certainty as much as there is a concrete expectation between the drafted player (asset) and the perspective team (buyer) that he will immediately participate in next season's upcoming games. However, in professional baseball this occurrence is usually not the case and is very uncommon even for first round draft picks in MLB. (As a side note, only 3 first round 2006 draft picks have made an appearance on professional rosters up to this point in the 2007 season).
Consequently, when Theo Epstein makes his yearly draft picks there is not always a guarantee that his draft-selections will translate into Major League impact talent. To go even further, there is a much higher probability that his draft choices will not be professionally ready for a couple of years after they have had appropriate seasoning or wont even make a MLB 25 or 40 man rosters in their entire careers. This is what makes Theo Epsteins recent drafting track record since 2002 even more impressive and which makes the selection of Clay Buchholz the most impressive draft acquisition in his career. From a management standpoint, the team now has access to inexpensive impact talent that allows them to organizationally address other important needs. The Red Sox front-office a couple years back identified that pitching would soon be considered the hardest commodity to find in all of sports (because small/mid market teams where no longer allowing their top notched pitchers to test the free-agent market, therefore signing them to risky multi-year contracts durring arbritration in order to remain competitive) and adopted a diversified business plan that would not stop the talent flow into the organization.
The previous statement regarding player drafting is highly important because there not only exists persistent developmental gaps between high school and college players in comparison to more highly skilled/seasoned professional ones, but there are also fundamental game differences which create incongruities that make it difficult for most players to quickly progress into the big leagues.
For example, the change from a aluminum to wooden bat for hitters as well as pitchers developing secondary pitches (curve ball, slider, breaking ball, fork ball splitter) are the two biggest reasons that make it near impossible for executives to predict the potential growth of baseball draft picks. Thus, Major League Baseball is the most unique sport developmentally and organizationally structured when viewed in fiscal terms. Without a doubt, this makes Buchholzs progression in the minor leagues the most impressive among a Red Sox minor-leaguer since Nomar Garciapara and holds the highest potential growth ceiling since Roger Clemens.
Reiterating back to the promising example of 2005 first-round draft pick Clay Buchholz, the Red Sox have successfully implemented a multi-faceted statistical-business model that enables them to constantly predict which type of players are most likely going to be solid fits for their organizations baseball culture. As a result, the team with it's hybrid drafting approach has firstly led them to developing a constant stream of in-house Major league impact talent. Secondly, it has given them newfound payroll flexibility, which prevents them from overspending on middle of the road players/aging veterans (Yankess/Mets are great at this!), or signing players to risky long-term contracts in order to remain competitive with the Yankees. Therefore, the Red Sox with Buchholz mostly along with other talents have been able to fill important roster spots, but continually in the future the team will be able to sign contracts without enduring the contractual/performance downfalls of the past. (Creates a productive talent multiplier effect..more talent for less dollars = more potential wins).
When all is said and done by the end of this season, the Red Sox current farm system since 2002 will have at least delivered 6 young core impact-talents (Pedroia, Youkulis, Papelbon, Ellsubry, Lester, and Buchholz). At the same time, developing many other complementary and potential core talents.
What the Farm System Does for the Team's Roster
Red Sox Pitching Staff W/Buchholz 2008
Best Pitching Staff In Baseball!!
1. Beckett signed through 2009
2. Dice-K singed through 2012
3. Tim Wakefield rolling option
4. John Lester 0.6 years service time
5. Clay Buchholz 0.0 years service time
(considered the best pitcher at the 2007 futures game)
www.baseballamerica.com/b...cts/?p=456
Red Sox Draft Picks on the Major League Roster
1b/3b. Youkulis 1.9 years of service time
2b. Pedroia 0.6 years of service time
Cf. Ellsbury 0.0 years of service time
Cl. Papelbon 1.3 years of service time
Su.Delcarmen 1.1 years of service time
For starters, there is no other professional sports league that involves franchises investing such large amounts of money into drafting unknown players, when there is constantly a high-risk level and limited growth potential coinciding with each other at the same time. In the other major American professional sports such as (MLS, NBA, NFL, NHL), when teams' draft early to mid-round players, there is a almost near certainty as much as there is a concrete expectation between the drafted player (asset) and the perspective team (buyer) that he will immediately participate in next season's upcoming games. However, in professional baseball this occurrence is usually not the case and is very uncommon even for first round draft picks in MLB. (As a side note, only 3 first round 2006 draft picks have made an appearance on professional rosters up to this point in the 2007 season).
Consequently, when Theo Epstein makes his yearly draft picks there is not always a guarantee that his draft-selections will translate into Major League impact talent. To go even further, there is a much higher probability that his draft choices will not be professionally ready for a couple of years after they have had appropriate seasoning or wont even make a MLB 25 or 40 man rosters in their entire careers. This is what makes Theo Epsteins recent drafting track record since 2002 even more impressive and which makes the selection of Clay Buchholz the most impressive draft acquisition in his career. From a management standpoint, the team now has access to inexpensive impact talent that allows them to organizationally address other important needs. The Red Sox front-office a couple years back identified that pitching would soon be considered the hardest commodity to find in all of sports (because small/mid market teams where no longer allowing their top notched pitchers to test the free-agent market, therefore signing them to risky multi-year contracts durring arbritration in order to remain competitive) and adopted a diversified business plan that would not stop the talent flow into the organization.
The previous statement regarding player drafting is highly important because there not only exists persistent developmental gaps between high school and college players in comparison to more highly skilled/seasoned professional ones, but there are also fundamental game differences which create incongruities that make it difficult for most players to quickly progress into the big leagues.
For example, the change from a aluminum to wooden bat for hitters as well as pitchers developing secondary pitches (curve ball, slider, breaking ball, fork ball splitter) are the two biggest reasons that make it near impossible for executives to predict the potential growth of baseball draft picks. Thus, Major League Baseball is the most unique sport developmentally and organizationally structured when viewed in fiscal terms. Without a doubt, this makes Buchholzs progression in the minor leagues the most impressive among a Red Sox minor-leaguer since Nomar Garciapara and holds the highest potential growth ceiling since Roger Clemens.
Reiterating back to the promising example of 2005 first-round draft pick Clay Buchholz, the Red Sox have successfully implemented a multi-faceted statistical-business model that enables them to constantly predict which type of players are most likely going to be solid fits for their organizations baseball culture. As a result, the team with it's hybrid drafting approach has firstly led them to developing a constant stream of in-house Major league impact talent. Secondly, it has given them newfound payroll flexibility, which prevents them from overspending on middle of the road players/aging veterans (Yankess/Mets are great at this!), or signing players to risky long-term contracts in order to remain competitive with the Yankees. Therefore, the Red Sox with Buchholz mostly along with other talents have been able to fill important roster spots, but continually in the future the team will be able to sign contracts without enduring the contractual/performance downfalls of the past. (Creates a productive talent multiplier effect..more talent for less dollars = more potential wins).
When all is said and done by the end of this season, the Red Sox current farm system since 2002 will have at least delivered 6 young core impact-talents (Pedroia, Youkulis, Papelbon, Ellsubry, Lester, and Buchholz). At the same time, developing many other complementary and potential core talents.
What the Farm System Does for the Team's Roster
Red Sox Pitching Staff W/Buchholz 2008
Best Pitching Staff In Baseball!!
1. Beckett signed through 2009
2. Dice-K singed through 2012
3. Tim Wakefield rolling option
4. John Lester 0.6 years service time
5. Clay Buchholz 0.0 years service time
(considered the best pitcher at the 2007 futures game)
www.baseballamerica.com/b...cts/?p=456
Red Sox Draft Picks on the Major League Roster
1b/3b. Youkulis 1.9 years of service time
2b. Pedroia 0.6 years of service time
Cf. Ellsbury 0.0 years of service time
Cl. Papelbon 1.3 years of service time
Su.Delcarmen 1.1 years of service time
You know how people feel about the Bronson aka Brandon trade, well, this is how I feel about Hanley.
